REVISITING AFFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND CONNATURALITY IN AQUINAS
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[The author investigates the nature and function of affective cognition through connaturality in Thomas Aquinas. Its modulations are disclosed in the human attraction to happiness, in emotions and their moral significance, in the affective virtues (fortitude and temperance), and in the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Finally, the article notes some convergences between the thought of Aquinas and Bernard Lonergan concerning conversion and intentionality, both epistemological and existential]
I N AN EARLIER ARTICLE in this journal, Charles Bouchard presents a survey of relevant 20th-century literature on the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the moral life. Bouchard rightly highlights, with Daniel Maguire, that Aquinas was aware of the "animating, affective mold of moral cognition" and that it permeated his portrayal of the Christian moral life. 1 Bouchard then proceeds to discuss the specific form of affective knowing accompanying the gifts as an instance of the pervasive influence of grace "interacting with human nature and capacities in an organic way." 2 At the end of his insightful and helpful discussion, he notes a number of areas that could be subject to further exploration. My own article takes one central idea in Bouchard's article since it offers the human context and capacities for the work and influence of the gifts. It probes the phenomenon of affective or appreciative knowing touched upon by Bouchard, THOMAS RYAN, S.M., received his Ph.D. (with distinction) from the University of Notre Dame Australia, Fremantle, Western Australia. Until recently a member of the College of Theology in the University of Notre Dame Australia, Fremantle, he is currently adjunct lecturer with the same university and with the Australian Catholic University, and a research fellow at Griffith University, Brisbane. His specialization focuses on the moral significance of emotions, as well as on human affectivity in theology and Christian living. He has contributed articles to the Australasian Catholic Record, Compass, and the Australian EJournal of Theology. Among his present research projects is a study on primordial moral awareness, interdisciplinary perspectives.
Maguire, and others.
3 As Bouchard recognizes, affective knowing is not unique, as a process, to the gifts of the Holy Spirit. There are other instances and forms of affective knowing in the moral life that provide a richer context for understanding the gifts. While Bouchard does not explore them, these processes of knowing, evaluating, and judging are important insofar as they are receptive, even hospitable, to the peculiar influence of the Spirit in our deeper sharing in the divine life through the gifts.
My article aims to investigate, in three stages, the nature and function of other modes of affective cognition through connaturality in Aquinas's moral anthropology. 4 My first part considers the affective knowing involved in our emotions as the basis of Aquinas's treatment of the affective virtues (fortitude and temperance). I then examine the immanent nature of the affective virtues as dispositions not so much to action but primarily toward responding emotionally in a specific way. This entails a probing of the "connatural" disposition or attunement to the good that accompanies the moral virtues. My second part explores the relationship between affective knowing, the virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In the third stage I return to 20th-century Thomism and note some convergences with Bernard Lonergan's thought, and then offer some final observations.
KNOWING, EMOTIONS AND THE AFFECTIVE VIRTUES
Bouchard's article builds on Maguire's view concerning the fallacy in modern ethical deliberation, namely that morality is essentially analytical and rationalistic in form, with the clarity of logic and mathematics. It 4 We need to broaden the scope and fine-tune the focus on the seven gifts viewed as the paradigm case of affective knowing. Aquinas's construal of the moral life is built on the gift of divine grace that permeates and transforms the whole person. If one is to attend to and interpret our world whose intelligibility is enhanced by divine love, then one needs key distinctions such as e.g. nature/grace, natural/ infused virtue, virtues/gifts. The aim here is to clarify how these elements relate and interact in a person's affectivity, not in sequential terms but in the simultaneity of a living organism. neglects the affective, appreciative, global dimension of moral knowing that animates and deepens one's moral awareness and judgments.
5 For Maguire, this more expansive view of moral cognition finds its roots in Aquinas, although he carefully notes the limits of the evidence. In his view, Aquinas does not explicitly or substantively systematize the idea of affective knowledge. It is, at the least, consonant with Aquinas's view of practical reason which orders behavior to what is good. Nevertheless, there are texts in which Aquinas explicitly acknowledges the affective aspect in moral cognition. For instance, Maguire notes that in the treatise De Malo, Aquinas twice in the one context uses the phrase "practical or affective reason."
6 While this example on its own is not probative, it has some significance when seen in the light of Aquinas's understanding of right reason in relation to the virtues. As Maguire states, for Aquinas "right reason, perfected by the moral virtues, has a connatural orientation toward the good ... which implies the affectional orientation toward the good." 7 This is examined later in my article.
It seems, then, that Aquinas considers that emotions and affectivity are in some way involved in practical reason's role of determining what is truly reasonable, truly good. This enables right reason, properly understood, to be the measure of moral action. A later commentator, John of St. Thomas, explicitly develops the notion of affective knowledge and makes it "the controlling category for an understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit." 8 While this is valid, there is an intervening link between affective knowing and the gifts that must not be overlooked. It is found in those moral virtues concerned with our emotional life. Aquinas offers an understanding of the affective virtues-fortitude and temperance-that can support an integrated view of the affective, appreciative dimensions of moral knowing. Such an approach means that not only moral perception but also responses and decisions are guided by the virtues and the gifts. My first task, then, is a brief look at the object of the affective virtues, namely properly ordered emotions. 5 Maguire, The Moral Revolution 255. 6 Ibid. 258, citing De Malo q. 16, a. 6, ad 13 and ad 8 for the phrase ratio practica seu affectiva. 7 Maguire, The Moral Revolution 258 and referring to Summa theologiae (ST) 1-2, q. 90, a.l c. For translations of the Summa, the author has consulted the Latin/English (Blackfriars) version of the English Dominican Province (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1963-1975) 
Emotions
My task here is not to investigate the nature, structure, and morality of the emotions. In general terms, without denying their destructive potential, emotions have a positive and integral role in the psychological, moral, and spiritual dimensions of Aquinas's anthropology. 9 Affective knowing can take the form of primordial moral awareness.
10 It can also assume a more specific and differentiated expression in our individual emotions. Emotions are a form of affective cognition in that they are an awareness of, and a reaction to objects perceived as good or bad. Aquinas, in his comprehensive discussion on this topic (equivalent to at least two books), would agree with Vacek's comment that without emotions-and their affective setting-a person "would be dead to the value of the world and of God. Emotions are in part cognitions; they apprehend objects as either positively or negatively valuable, as good or evil. Through emotions we become attached to those great goods that inspire our lives, and without them 'we become incapable of understanding any moral argument at all.' " n More specifically, some key points can be highlighted for the purposes of my present article. [73] [74] . Vacek approaches the emotions using a more phenomenological method than does Aquinas yet his summing up of the four "moments" in the structure of an emotion substantively concurs with the analysis of Aquinas. "Emotion is a complex activity: the self (1) as an openness-io-good (2) becomes conscious <?/the value of a specific object, (3) is affected by that valuable object, and (4) responds to the object's value" (Vacek, 12).
Firstly, Aquinas uses the term "appetite" to explain our emotions. We are needy creatures, with yearnings and desires that are powerful and persistent. We need many things that are good but we cannot give them to ourselves. They attract, even fascinate us but we can only receive them. As Wadell expresses it, our passions and affections indicate that we are "made to receive the world."
12 This is reflected in Aquinas's treatment of the structure of an emotion (as passio animae). For him, it is a mode of knowing, a being affected by, and responding to, an object. An emotion is a form of affective knowing or appreciation-a blend of awareness (apprehending an object), of the intentional, the bodily, and the affective, which coalesce as an interactive response to value or disvalue. 13 An emotion, then, has two poles, passive and active, receiving and responding.
Secondly, emotions are psychosomatic events. Bodily changes are the distinguishing characteristic of those emotional responses that Aquinas names as the passiones animae. While the body is the matrix of affective change in an emotion, it is also receptive to the overflow of the spiritual affectus. In other words, the organic unity of the person means that there is a mutual interaction of the spiritual and bodily forms of affectivity that converge in the psychological realm. The body can resonate from the overflow of the will's intensity into an emotion and this enhances the moral worth of an action.
14 Alternatively, the will can be strengthened, confirmed, and animated by the presence of emotion. Further, as shall be noted later, the will can be moved by an emotion in terms of its object. The more emotions are directed by right reason, the more they facilitate the use of reason and draw a person more intensely to the good.
Thirdly, Aquinas uses the model of physical movement as his heuristic tool to explain the dynamics of an emotion. As a body moves toward its object, so a person moves toward the goal of living which is happiness. The person and the human powers (operations) move (are activated) by being drawn ("inclined") by the desire for happiness. While this may be a model grounded in medieval physics, D'Arcy suggests that it can be interpreted in 12 Wadell, The Primacy of Love 80. 13 ST 1-2, q. 22, a. 2-3. "Emotion" is used here to include the two forms of affective change or movement used by Aquinas. Those in the sensitive appetite are called the "passions" or passiones animae: those in the intellective appetite (will) are called affectus (See ST 1, q. 82, a. 5, ad 1; 1, q. 20, a. 1, ad 1). Hence, the phrase "human affectivity" also captures the body/spirit aspect of human personhood. D'Arcy captures this dual aspect by translating appetitus and appetitiva as orexis and orectic. This is to convey the dual movement together with the intellectual (will) and sensory level of the emotions. He notes modern psychology's use of orexis and orectic to distinguish the affective and conative dimensions of human activity from the cognitive (Eric D'Arcy, Intro., Notes, Trans, of Summa Theologiae (la.2ae.qq.22-30) vol. 19 [London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1967] xxiv).
14 ST 1-2, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1. modern terms. A body, by entering the earth's field of gravity, is drawn ("inclined") to move toward the earth's center. 15 The closer it comes to that center, the stronger is the pull toward it.
Fittingness and Connaturality
The metaphor of gravity's pull or inclination has a range of expressions in Aquinas. 16 Just as there is an analogous character to knowledge, so there are variations on, or rather analogical usages of, the notion of connaturalitas. The common element is in the definition suggested by D'Arcy, namely that connaturality denotes a sense that the object "and oneself are naturally fitted for each other."
17 What emerges from the various texts is that there are different modes of connaturality according to the intentionality of the subject or the power.
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At the most basic level, connaturalitas or fittingness accompanies the human mode of embodied existence in the world. It is connatural for human beings to be guided to the invisible through the mediation of the visible.
19 Again, connaturality is integral to the teleological structure of Aquinas's philosophical framework. 20 The attraction or gravitational pull toward happiness is described by Aquinas as amor which D'Arcy suggests is better translated as "liking." It is a necessary quality, a condition of possibility. For Aquinas, it is the first of all the emotions and is located in the affective orexis (the concupiscible appetite). It is an attachment to an object arising from the sense that there is a natural "fit" between the object and oneself.
The second group of relevant usages occurs early in Aquinas's Prima Secundae. In Question 9, he uses words other than connaturalitas, an indication that connaturality's second expression emerges in a developmental process. Aquinas explores the role of fittingness or attunement (what is conveniens, consonans, dissonans) in relation to the moral object as it is perceived and judged in an emotional response. Here, Aquinas argues that an emotion, through its object, moves the will. Something is perceived to be good because reason, as guided by the emotion, judges it fitting, appropriate, as "ringing true."
21 If the person's disposition is good, it will be a rightly ordered object that the emotion responds to and so moves the will. This is the foundation of the morality of the emotions discussed later in Summa theologiae 1-2, q. 24.
The emotion, then, can influence the will either by opposing it, by distorting rational judgments, or by guiding it to move toward what promotes true happiness. Here it is not connaturalitas (of object and will "naturally" fitted to each other). It is fittingness but under certain conditions. Emotions participate, in an initial but real way, in rationality. If they are incipiently rational, they are incipiently moral. 22 But they need to be guided and completed by reason. An emotion is not "naturally fitting" and thus needs to be rightly tuned (consonans, conveniens). It moves toward being "naturally fitting" (connaturalitas) as it is guided by its appropriate virtue. When the emotion is guided by right reason under the influence of virtue, the attuned, fitting object guides practical reason. 23 This brings us, then, to the virtues.
The Affective Virtues
Seeing emotions in a broader context, Aquinas acknowledges that it is better that a person be bent on the good not merely with the will but with the sensory orexis (appetite), namely in one's emotional life (in the pas-21 ST 1-2, q. 9, a.1-2 where the Latin wording is "conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione."
22 ST 1-2, q. 24, a.l, ad 2. 23 The importance of connaturality or attunement as "ringing true" is reflected in a contemporary author's comment that affectivity in the moral life is "related intrinsically to its intellectuality. Moral action is not sufficiently explicable as having good feelings or in being lovingly disposed, but as the good feelings and loving dispositions that flow from the intrinsic intelligibility of the universe as a theatre of divine meaning" (Anthony siones animae)} 4 Hence, the goodness of an act is increased by emotional involvement whether by overflow from the energy of the will or by a deliberate act of the will to arouse the emotion. 25 Further, the right intention of an end concerning the emotion comes from the good disposition of the irascible or concupiscible powers. 26 But what is meant by "good disposition" with reference to the moral virtues concerned with those powers, namely fortitude and temperance?
Temperance and fortitude are the affective virtues that guide the emotions through which we construe and evaluate our world. They blend cognitive and affective aspects that help us to know, appreciate, and respond to the objects in our world insofar as they are values or disvalues.
At the outset, Aquinas, in locating the affective virtues, rejects any dualistic notion that true virtue lies in the superior dimension of the spirit (as found in Nominalist and Voluntarist positions). For him, the affective powers are capable of moral value. 27 They can have their own proper perfection, namely in their virtues exercised through an integral relationship with mind and will. For Aquinas, "[t]he human dignity of the passions is such that they enjoy in the active outflowing of the spirit (derivatio) their natural energy and even their freedom of direction. In this way they are subjects of virtues and possess authentic moral value, for better or for worse." 28 Aquinas understands virtue as disposing us to act as habitually moved by 24 ST 1-2, q. 24, a. 3. In the same article, he states that our body/spirit makeup determines that our good activity is in conjunction with passion "even as it is produced by the help (ministerio) of the body" (See q. 24, a. 3, ad 3). These texts indicate that, prima facie, Aquinas is intent on providing an integrated view of the body/spirit relationship as it is embodied in the emotions (intellective and bodily appetites). As intellectual creatures we are moral beings, open to receiving and being touched by God, yet only as corporeal beings can we be fully human. Aquinas is trying to blend two traditions, the Platonic and the Aristotelian. This may account for what appears to be a residual tension in his treatment of questions on the body/spirit relationship, e.g., the nature of the soul, knowledge, emotions. The contribution of the bodily emotions to virtue and love of God seems to rest not so much from their own worth but inasmuch as they receive the overflow (resonance) of the higher affectus (will). The question arises whether or when the influence, or the resonance, can go the other way? (I am grateful for the helpful comments on this area from Carlo Leget).
25 ST 1-2, q. 24, a. 3, ad 1. Elsewhere, Aquinas says that this is also true of moral virtues such as justice (concerned with operations) as when the joy in its exercise by the will flows downwards into the emotions (redundantia gaudii). The more perfect a moral virtue is, the more it reverberates in our emotions (See ST 1-2, q. 59, a. 5).
26 ST 1-2, q. 56, a. What is crucial for our discussion is that, for Aquinas, the terminus or outcome of the affective virtues is not an action but the changes in the subject (power or faculty) from which emerges the appropriate level of emotional response. The affective capacity of the person can be modified and hence grow in sensitivity, intensity, and scope. The affective virtues, then, are not primarily about actions (though they may lead to actions). Their primary habitual disposition as virtues (their condition of possibility, their attunement to being itself as good) is toward the fitting emotional response, namely one that is according to right reason. Hence, to adapt Aristotle, the virtuous person is disposed to respond emotionally, to the right things, at the right time, and to the right degree.
33 This is how they exercise their rationality and contribute to human well-being and growth both personally and in the realm of our relationships.
Any virtue is transformative of the subject. 34 A person is changed such that the orientation or habitual disposition to what is good becomes connatural or second nature. 35 Here, Aquinas resumes his use of the word connaturalitas. This is the second mode of connaturality in Aquinas through which the object and oneself "are in some way naturally fitted for 29 ST 1-2, q. 68, a. 1; q. 55, a. 4. 30 ST 1-2. q. 60, a. 2. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. The highlighting of afficitur will be explained later at n. 56. 33 One author notes: "Whether acquired or infused, temperance is a deliberately cultivated, stable disposition to respond well to certain objects of experience. It is partly a disposition to respond well in action, but Thomas's main concern is with the affective dimension of our responsiveness" (Diana Fritz Cates, "The Virtue of Temperance," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Pope, 321-39, at 321-22).
34 ST 1-2. q. 52, a. 2; q. 55, a.l; q. 59, a. 4. 35 ST 1-2. q. 32, a. 6; q. 27, a. 1. These are the discussions of good as the cause of pleasure and love. each other." Virtues, in general and by definition, do not have a conditioned but rather a connatural orientation to what is good, as if such a condition is second nature ("naturally fitted"). Virtue is a certain attunement to the order of being, namely to being as good, valuable. But what is different as this applies to virtues that guide the emotions? There are two things, one to do with the mode of connaturality, the other with its new intentionality.
Firstly, as has already been noted, the actual mode of "fittingness" (connaturalitas) has a specific quality for the affective virtues (compared, for instance, with the virtue of justice). It is a disposition not so much to act as to being affected and to respond to the right things and values, those that are truly good. For Aquinas, the affective virtues are understood such that a person's affectivity (embodied emotional capacity) can be gradually modified in its habitual disposition so that (as with other virtues), the subject is transformed. A person seeks, recognizes, and responds to what is truly fitting and good with greater pleasure, promptness, ease, regularity, and joy. 36 In modern terms, one could describe this is an aspect of "interiorization," a process in which one grows cognitively and affectively and one comes to see "that virtuous acts are good and is pleased in doing them." 37 Further, virtue is a process of habituation and hence of growth. For Aquinas, there is a drive toward that stage called perfect virtue whereby it is exercised not only according to (secundum) right reason but "with (cum) right reason." 38 Here, it is not just the case of the emotion increasing the goodness of actions by the influence of the will (either by overflowing of intensity or by deliberate arousal). Clearly, virtue's goal is that the moral act (and for affective virtues, its appropriate emotion) be measured not according to right reason but "with" right reason. It is not so much ordered, pointed in the "right direction" by reason but "in tune with" right reason. Alternatively, emotions, guided by virtue, have moved from fittingness in its conditional form (consonans, conveniens) to one of being "naturally fitted" (connaturalis). Feeling, thinking, willing resonate with each other that this particular response is "right." Intellect, will, and emotions seem 36 sj i_2. q. 32, a. 6; q. 33, a. 4; q. 55, a. 4. Maguire notes that the phenomenon of affective knowing is even clearer in Aquinas's notion of "connaturality through love" or "affective connaturality." The philosophy and theology of Aquinas "include love not only as a stimulator to knowledge but as an illumining factor in knowing" (Maguire, The Moral Revolution 262). 37 Clifford G. Kossel, S.J., "Natural Law and Human Law (la Ilae, qq. 90-97)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Pope, 169-93, at 188, n. 51.
38 ST 1-2. q. 58, a. 4, ad 3.
here to have a relationship that is certainly not one of control and is more collaborative than directive.
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In other words, emotions are at their best within a collaborative relationship, where there is a mutual resonance about what is fitting. This is the connaturality of virtue at work in the fullest sense. 40 Our considerations seem to indicate that, for Aquinas, moral action is an interpenetration of intellect and will. From what has been seen here, one must also say that, for Aquinas, such interpenetration includes rightly ordered habitual emotional responses within the dynamics of practical reason. This is the significance of ratio practica seu affectiva. Consequently, there are richer connotations to "Aristotle's notion of choice as reasoning desire or desiring reason." 41 This is all the more true when one considers the influence of divine grace 39 This raises again the tension or ambivalence in Aquinas. He seems to mirror life-experience by using three categories of language to describe the passions/right reason relationship. The first (and least used) is one of control/submission (e.g., obedire, impero, subjacent imperio rationis). The second (most common) is of direction/guidance/moderation (e.g., regulata, ordinantur, dirigatur, moderatione). Thirdly, there are words indicating attunement in a collaborative relationship with intellect and will where emotions guide reason to be "right" {conveniens, consonans, cum ratione). One gets the impression that this perspective is certainly present in, but is not fully elaborated by Aquinas. One way it can be mined for its riches is by way of Aquinas's use of spatial metaphors (space, direction, and dimension). It can reveal the way Aquinas uses metaphors, especially those built on a phenomenology of emotional and embodied experience, so as to attenuate and transcend the limits of his language and of his philosophical framework. For a perceptive and very helpful discussion of this, see Carlo Leget, "Moral Theology Upside Down. Aquinas's Treatise de passionibus animae Considered through the Lens of Its Spatial Metaphors," Jaarboek Thomas Instituut 1999 (Utrecht: Thomas Instituut, 2000) 101-26. 40 When Aquinas talks of the connaturality of virtue, he is using fully realized virtue as the basic analogue. Growth toward a habit is gradual (ST 1-2, q. 5, a. 1). It seems to follow that the transition from one form of fittingness to the other (emotions as conveniens/consonans to attuned emotions as connatural) means that one can have greater or lesser degrees of connaturality. Aquinas suggests this when he says that habit is like a second nature yet it falls short of it (ST 1-2, q. 52, a. 1, adl). 41 Thomas S. Hibbs, "Interpretations of Aquinas's Ethics since Vatican II," in The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Pope, 412-25, at 420. The argument here brings together a number of considerations snowing how emotions are discerning appreciations of value taking the form of appropriate interactive responses. As suggested in n. 39 and n. 24, from our considerations so far, there seems to be not so much an uneasy but an unfinished quality in Aquinas's effort to integrate and complete emotions as participating in rationality. A similar concern is expressed by Diana Fritz Cates. "My point is that the value of rightly-ordered passion should be affirmed, not simply 'from the top down' (as overflow from a movement of the will), but also 'from the bottom up' (as valuable in itself and in its ability to open us up to a richer experience of God as God discloses Godself in ordinary objects of sense)" (Choosing to Feel 249, n. 23).
in which right reason is transvalued in terms of a relationship with God. This brings one to the final mode of connaturality whose object brings a new intentionality.
AFFECTIVE COGNITION, VIRTUES, GIFTS: COMMON GROUND
The gifts of the Holy Spirit accompany the transforming gift of grace whereby a person participates more and more in the knowing, loving, and responding of the persons of the Trinity. Because God is the object (a new horizon), there is a shift to a higher level of spiritual activity of the intellect, will, and the virtues so that, through the gifts, their mode of operation exceeds their natural boundaries, the limits of reason. The graced person is enabled to operate in a suprarational mode, governed by divine instinct rather than by the calculative mode of reason. The person is moved to the third level of connaturality beyond that of the virtues, even though these are under the influence of grace. It is described as an instinct, a "taste" for the things of God that draws one to perceive, choose, and respond in a manner that is "second nature," namely, as if it is natural and normal for us to know, feel, love, and act as God does. For Aquinas, this is appropriately described as wisdom, an immediate knowing that comes from loving.
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Two Modes of Wisdom
Aquinas distinguishes yet holds together two modes of wisdom. One form of judgment is based on a "mystical" connaturality of love that comes from inclination or virtue and the other is the "rational" way of intellectual inquiry. 43 Aquinas sees "his theology as the development of a primal kind of wisdom, of sapientia, in which the taste faith and love have for the divine reality are expressed in the form of an intellectual good taste. It is never a matter of seeing or comprehending the divine reality but of having a taste for it." 44 It is important to note the rationale for this. For Aquinas, faith's certitude is in the realm of the affective. 45 Further, the movement toward faith in the Son of God is through a divinely fashioned instinct that draws 42 ST 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2. Beyond knowing God in what he does, "loving familiarity with God is possible (ST 1.2. q. 27, a. 2, ad 2), since love for God can go further than knowledge, to 'join' us to what exceeds our knowing" (Anthony J. Kelly 46 Importantly, the act of faith does not arrive at a proposition but at the reality of the personal God. 47 Taken together Aquinas concludes that it is only love that can bond us with the real in experiential awareness. It is a knowing love, a form of affective cognition that is rational but which can achieve what the "rational" narrowly construed (as discursive, analytical knowledge) is unable to do. This is clearly a form of what Lonergan would describe as constitutive meaning. The indwelling of the Trinity in the believer's consciousness informs a person with new understanding of the self, of the self-inrelationship, and of the divine persons. From this source emerges the objective, analytical, or cognitive dimension of meaning. Theology as science must have its foundations in theology as wisdom.
Aquinas recapitulates this when he discusses the gift of wisdom. * 7 ST 2-2. q. 1, a. 2, ad 3. 48 ST 2-2. q. 45, a. 2. "I answer that, as stated above (1), wisdom denotes a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality. Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that "Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things." Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Corinthians 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit." Consequently wisdom which is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (I-II, 14,1)" (translation accessed 8/18/2003).
wisdom involves evaluating and judging, its cause and animating force is in the will.
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Connaturality as Attunement, Compassion with God
How can one describe this receptivity to being increasingly sensitized to the divine touch? How does it relate to our emotions and our human affectivity? R. J. Snell's approach can be helpful here. He suggests that Aquinas "thinks of connaturality as sympathy for the divine." 50 But Snell notes that sympathy is not a judgment, assent, or something one can directly will.
51 It entails a passive component, namely being affected. Sympathy, together with our emotions and affections, often happens to us, often "whether one desires them or not." 52 The connaturality for things divine (patiens) and the "open to the world" nature of our emotions (as passiones animae) share a common ground. Snell writes that connaturality is a sympathy, which, like our emotions, is receptive.
Snell then goes on to say that if one is to understand connaturality, and thereby wisdom, one cannot be content with Aquinas's description of connaturality "as caused by the will and having its essence in cognition." 53 Snell suggests that connaturality is in the realm of affection but not as feelings because of their roots in the body and with external objects. He suggests, borrowing from Heidegger, the notions of Befindlichkeit or Stim-49 "In this knowledge through union or inclination, connaturality or congeniality, the intellect is at play not alone, but together with affective inclinations and the dispositions of the will, and is guided and directed by them. It is not rational knowledge, knowledge through the conceptual, logical and discursive exercise of Reason. But it is really and genuinely knowledge, though obscure and perhaps incapable of giving account of itself, or of being translated into words." See Jacques Maritain, "On Knowledge through Connaturality," chap. 51 While this is true, it should be remembered that one can arouse sympathy or other emotions and feeling states indirectly by deliberately engaging in activities of the memory or imagination. 52 Snell, "Connaturality in Aquinas" 2. 53 Ibid. 2. Aquinas's ambivalence is picked up by Snell. He notes that Aquinas, like many others, is not quite sure what to do with affection. At times he "relegates" it to "mere goods desired by sense," or into the will since love seems to be volitional and even into cognition "if emotions are thought of as judgements." Aquinas's appeal to connaturality as sympathy seems to be, at least, an implicit recognition of affection's role in wisdom and consciousness (Snell, 2-3). mung denoting mood or attunement to Being itself which is the condition of possibility for particular feelings. In the more specific setting of faith, "connaturality, then, is an attunement toward the Divine, a tendency toward, a resonance with, a sympathy or conformity to the Divine. In short, connaturality is a co-nature, i.e., is a shared nature or familiarity with the Divine." 54 Snell is describing, in its full, graced sense, the first "moment" in the structure of an emotion noted earlier from Vacek, namely "the self (1) as an openness-to-good" 55 Snell's point has a broader significance in the light of our considerations. The intentionality of our emotions and of our affective knowing is toward being-as-good. If goodness is self-diffusive in that its generosity cannot help but overrun its own banks, then the value-oriented intentionality of human affectivity, as spiritual or passional, is inherently relational and centrifugal. As such it shares in the dynamism of trinitarian life. Thus, Aquinas's notion of affective resonance between will and emotions through the body is consistent with their intentionality (and that of human existence) toward goodness and value precisely as the "overflow" within being. Our emotions, and particularly our human affectivity as shaped and transformed by the affective virtues, provide the organic condition of attunement, the sensitized matrix that is elevated and transformed by grace and the gifts This mode of connaturality with the gift of wisdom is related to that of the affective virtues. In both cases, there is a common language of being moved, affected by the virtue's object (afficitur, patitur, passiones animae) 56 and patiens where the objects one is moved by are "divine things." The affective virtues, like the gifts, are enduring dispositions to be receptive and responsive to the right things, at the right time, to the right degree. The change of object and horizon in the gift of grace means that simultaneously the focus shifts from the virtuous person's self-direction (in terms of right reason), from striving to respond to God's love by one's own personal efforts under grace to the state of being increasingly receptive to God's mode of knowing, loving, and responding.
Further, as already noted, with the virtues the path to integration is from secundum rationem to cum ratione. With the gifts a similar language is employed. When Aquinas wishes to express the notion of being moved by 54 Ibid. 3. Snell goes on to argue that connaturality or attunement to Being is the transcendental condition of the dynamism of the structure of the operations of intentional consciousness. But that is beyond the scope of this article. 55 See n. 11 above. 56 See n. 32 above.
divine things through wisdom, connaturality is described as compassio 51 This is not just sympathy "for" the things of God but sympathy "with" or conformity with God as friends sharing a life together. 58 Through sharing in the divine intersubjectivity, our intentional consciousness and operations share increasingly in those of God, in knowing, loving, and responding. 59 It points to a capacity for co-feeling, of feeling with, able to be affected as God feels and is affected. It is also a shift in emphasis in the two polarities of emotion as passive/active: from being emotionally responsive (affective virtues) to being affectively receptive (gifts as divine action). The spotlight is now on the divine activity drawing a person into the divine life, so that that person has an attunement, a gravitational pull toward knowing, feeling, appreciating, willing, and loving as God does. This is the mode of connaturality in which the person, as capax Dei, is most receptive to God and divine activity.
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New Congeniality
I have noted that virtues and gifts "are two different modes of grace. The first is frequent, deliberate, and thoughtful. The second is intuitive, prompt, and supradeliberative." 61 Maguire describes this in similar terms when he notes that the gifts bring a "new and distinct proportion and congeniality" 62 and help to deepen a way of knowing that is "affectively qualified." 63 However, from what has been seen, there is a form of affective knowing that may not have, in Maguire's words, the "new and distinct proportion and congeniality" coming from the gifts. "Affectively qualified" and "congenial" are also true of moral knowledge in our emotional life and that of the affective virtues. It is captured in the different modes of connaturality that have been described with their similarity of texture and dynamic but with their different forms of intentionality.
The affective virtues, then, contribute to moral reasoning and responsiveness yet resemble more the intuitive, the prompt (while being frequent) quality of the gifts than the deliberative and thoughtful (yet not being supradeliberative) of the other moral virtues. Our emotions, while being intentional (object-oriented) and subject to conscious modification, are in some ways closer in their rationality to instinctive knowing than to deliberative, calculated knowing.
So while the Spirit's gifts, as with the passive vulnerability of sleep, bring things "so passing strange and wonderful," they are not alien incursions into human life and awareness. They are received in a matrix of affective knowing shaped through basic moral awareness and then through the particular affective virtues that, in their turn, can be enhanced, expanded, "transvalued" and become supradeliberative and more intuitive, prompt, effortless. One could argue that the evaluative "knowing" expressed through our emotions and the affective virtues anticipates and seeks to share "in the divine spontaneity in acting in a way that goes beyond a deliberative mode of activity ... here the accent is on incalculable action, inspired thought, instinctive grasp, the surrender of man to the Mystery of God working palpably within him."
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TRAJECTORY OF AFFECTIVE KNOWING: A CONTEMPORARY VIEW
From the first two parts of my article, two things emerge: firstly, there is a continuity in Aquinas's language to describe the nature, texture, intentionality, and trajectory of affective knowledge and the modulations of connaturality. 65 Secondly, by bringing a magnifying glass to the threads making up Aquinas's treatment of human affectivity (from emotions through affective virtues to the gifts), its warp and weave appear to be more cohesive and consistent than appears at first sight. This may indicate that the residual tension noted earlier in Aquinas is a mirror of life itself, one that is creative rather than one that requires resolution.
So, in the third and final stage, I return to where I began with Charles Bouchard-the 20th century and, more specifically, the transcendental Thomism of, for instance, Bernard Lonergan. On the issue of affective cognition, are there any convergences between the metaphysically structured psychology of Aquinas and, for example, the more phenomenological intentionality analysis of Lonergan? Perhaps it can be seen in the key aspect of affective knowledge captured by Aquinas's language. It is an operation of consciousness, simultaneously loving and knowing, in a for-ward movement toward greater intimacy interfused with immediate, intuitive reasoning. Here are three suggestions in that regard.
Firstly, there is conversion. The description of the gifts as habitual dispositions to be moved by the Spirit articulates a psychological reality. It entails a new, divinely given "quality of consciousness that comes about when man enters definitively into the horizon determined by Infinite Love, existentially appreciated as the real space of his living." 66 It is a disclosure of the divine mystery whose reality, as has been noted, can be attained by faith while always exceeding human understanding. It is a form of conversion that is the experience of vertical freedom where there is "a dismantling of limited horizons of knowing and loving for something more personal and complete, something darkly and intimately felt, beyond the capacities of language and thought... a deeper experience of freedom as enlarged and extended by the activity of God himself." 67 Secondly, Aquinas's description of connaturality, as in the example above, 68 is of a person who is virtuous (chaste), who judges what is truly good and acts in such a way. It is not simply affective "knowledge" but of connaturality that implies action. Further, as Snell points out, connaturality "allows a leap over levels" in Lonergan's cognitional structure. 69 A person might bypass understanding (with its questions and insights) and move directly to judgment. But since wisdom as connaturality is a matter of affection, it involves knowledge (judgment through attunement) but is also a further level, that of action. 70 It is connaturality that involves a certain mode of being (participation in divine life), a receptiveness to being acted on by God, and to perceiving, judging, responding, and acting in a divine way. Conformity with God is a seeing with, a shared resonance with God. It resembles what is, for Lonergan, the apex of existential intentionality in the Christian life. It also embodies, for both Aquinas and Lonergan, the interpenetration of morality and spirituality in personal life.
Thirdly and finally, in Lonergan's hermeneutic of cognitive interiority, the dynamic of self-transcendence is the constant drive to the "more" in our understanding, valuing, judging the truth, loving. It is "a movement from below to what exceeds all human grasp, even as it impels the reaching toward it. Openness to experience is openness to all that can be experienced." CONCLUSION I have argued that affective knowledge as a controlling category has a scope that goes beyond the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 79 The case rests on the consistency in Aquinas's understanding of, and language for, connaturality as expressed in the magnetic pull toward happiness, in the emotions and their moral significance developmentally, in the affective virtues, and finally in the gifts. Thinking, feeling, willing, and acting have a symbiotic and mutually conditioning relationship by which the image of God is established and gradually realized. By widening the lens beyond the paradigm case of affective cognition in the gifts and sharpening its focus, we arrive at a richer view of "congeniality" and its organic nature and context. It applies as much to the receptiveness of human affectivity to grace as it does to its shift to a higher register of attunement through infused charity and the gifts. It is summed up in the life-giving Spirit's presence in the multiform and interlocking realities that make up human and Christian existence. My considerations have uncovered some possible points of convergence between Aquinas and Lonergan.
My discussion points to the ongoing relevance of Aquinas for today's world. His concern with affective knowing as a bearer of truth and insight corrects a view of rationality that restricts its scope to analysis and scientific objectivity. Recent research on the role of emotional intelligence has clear resonances with Aquinas's approach to affective cognition. I find in his work evidence of what Tarnas describes as a "participative epistemology" in contrast to the dualist form that has so deeply influenced the Western sensibility since Descartes and Kant. 80 For the Church, Aquinas's approach to theology is a wholesome reminder to today's practitioners in the field that the foundations of the theological enterprise lie in the loving knowledge, the taste for God found in the gift of wisdom.
The trinitarian hue of Aquinas's moral vision, originating in and shaped by the gift of grace, is disclosed in the interactive, responsive texture, and intentionality of our affectivity. It moves toward its realization more by God's action through the gifts than by our own efforts. In that sense, there is an irruptive dimension, a discontinuity that is the foundation of the Christian life. But there is also a line of continuity, whereby nature is open to being elevated and transformed. Our humanity, and especially its affective realm, offers a matrix that is uniquely hospitable to be magnetized by God's love and to be sensitized to God's touch.
